



# SK ID Solutions AS - Certificate Policy for Digi-ID

Version 8.0

OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.10015.1.2

Effective since 01.11.2018

Version History		
Date	Version	Changes
01.11.2018	8.0	Added that Certificate re-key may be done for validity extension of Digi-ID. Therefore, clauses 4.7, 4.7.1, 4.7.2 and 4.7.3 of this CP have been amended accordingly.
01.11.2017	7.0	<p>Due to change of SK's business name from AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus to SK ID Solutions AS, name of the CP has been changed accordingly. Also, former business name has been replaced with the new one in clauses 1.1, 1.2, 1.5.1 and 1.6.2 of this CP;</p> <p>Clause 1.1 - Removed paragraph which stated that the CP a complete redesign of the previous AS Sertifitseerimiskeskus - Certification Practice Statement and ESTEID Card Certification Policy;</p> <p>Clauses 1.1 and 1.3.2 - lingual corrections;</p> <p>Clause 1.6.2 - added new acronyms and minor changes;</p> <p>Clauses 4.9.1, 4.9.2, 4.9.3, 4.9.13, 4.9.17, 4.9.18, 4.9.19, 9.15 - replaced Estonian eIDAS supplement Act with Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act.</p>
01.11.2016	6.0	Redesigned the Certificate Policy in accordance with the IETF RFC 3647 [5] and eIDAS [2].

25.01.2016	5.0	<p>Chapter 1.2 - changed terminology.  Chapter 1.3 - updated list of Abbreviations.  Chapter 1.4 - changed identification of the Certification Policy.  Chapter 1.5.2 - changed description of Registration Centre.  Chapter 1.5.3 - changed description of PBGB.  Chapter 1.5.4 - changed description of TRÜB.  Chapter 1.6 - changed Contact Details of PBGB.  Chapter 2.1.1 - changed description of SK Obligations.  Chapter 2.1.2.1 - changed description of Obligations of the PBGB Client Service Point.  Chapter 2.1.3 - changed description of Obligations of the PBGB.  Chapter 2.1.4 - changed Obligations of Clients.  Chapter 2.5 - changed description of Audit.  Chapter 3.1 - changed description of Identification of Client.  Chapter 4.1 - changed description of Submission of Applications for Certificates.  Chapter 4.2.1 - changed description of Decision Making.  Chapter 4.4 - changed description of Suspension of Certificates.  Chapter 4.5 - changed description of Termination of Suspension.  Chapter 4.6.2 - changed description of Submission of Application for Revocation.  Chapter 6.1.2.1 - changed description of Creating Client Keys.  Chapter 9 - updated the list of Referred and Related Documents.  According to changes in certificate renewal and exchange procedure following chapters are also changed:  Chapter 2.1.2.2 - Obligations of the SK Client Service Point;  Chapter 3.2 - Procedure of Certifying Correspondence of Applicant's Private Key to Public Key;  Chapter 4.2.2 - Issuing Certificates;  Chapter 4.2.3 - Issuance of the ID card, the RP card and the Digi-ID. Activation of the Certificates;  Chapter 4.2.5 - Certificate Renewal and Exchange.</p>
01.12.2014	4.0	<p>Editorial corrections and improvements to document formatting.  Adjusted the document content description.  Chapter 1.2 - updated with new terms of E-resident digi-ID, ID-1 format.  Chapter 1.6 - updated contact details of SK and PBGB.  Chapter 2.1.2 and 2.1.3 improved obligations of registration centre and PBGB.  Chapter 2.4.2 - updated publication frequency of Certificate Revocation List.  Chapter 4.6.1 - updated authority to revoke certificates.  Chapter 6.1.2.1 - specified creation of client keys.  Chapter 6.1.2.3 - improved rules of activation of client's private key.</p>

01.09.2012	3.3	Added exchange of certificates for ID cards and RP cards that are issued on the year 2011. Chapter 1.2 – updated terminology. Chapter 2.1.2 – improved obligations of the registration centre. Chapter 4.2.5 – amended certificate renewal and exchange.
01.01.2011	3.2	New document added – the residence permit card with the associated actions. Chapter 4.2.1 – specified submission of Digi-ID certificate applications. Chapter 4.2.3 – amended certificate activation, certificates are activated immediately, in the presence of the client. Chapter 4.2.5 – specified certificate updating and permissibility of actions for different documents. Chapter 6.1.2.1 – specified creation of client keys.
01.10.2010	3.1	Added the requirements applicable to digital personal identification and the 2 OID value assigned to the document.
01.01.2010	2.2	Organisational changes: CMB is now known as PBGB (Police and Border Guard Board); PBGB and SK addresses renewed
28.08.2009	2.1	Combined with the renewed CPS of the SK. Lingual corrections. Updated chapter 1.5.1 – specified role distribution between different organisations. Updated chapter 4.2.3 – the certificates are being activated within 1 hour subsequent to issuance of the ID card.
19.06.2006	2.0	Updates according to the structure of the new ID card contract.
17.10.2002	1.2	Combined with the CPS of the SK. Amended with topics of certificate renewal and change of the PIN codes of the ID card.
10.11.2001	1.1	First public edition.

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# 1. Introduction

## 1.1. Overview

This document, named "SK ID Solutions AS – Certificate Policy for Digi-ID" (hereinafter referred to as CP), defines procedural and operational requirements that SK ID Solutions AS adheres to and requires entities to adhere to when issuing and managing Certificates for the digital identity document as well as for the e-residence cards (hereinafter together referred to as Digi-ID) issued by the Republic of Estonia. These Certificates facilitate electronic signatures and electronic identification of natural persons. The Certificates always come in pairs: each Digi-ID contains one Authentication Certificate and one Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate and their corresponding Private Keys. Each Private Key is protected by separate Activation Data (PIN code) and each Digi-ID has a single Unlock (PUK) code. A single person can have only one valid Digi-ID at any point in time. Digi-ID is physically shaped in ID-1 format, comply to the ISO/IEC 7816 [1] and ID Card documentation [15].

Issuing and managing Certificates for Digi-ID is based on the Regulation (EU) N° 910/2014 [2] which establishes a legal framework for electronic signatures.

This document describes only restrictions to Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to natural persons where the private key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD (QCP-n-qscd) from ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4] and Normalized Certificate Policy requiring a secure cryptographic device (NCP+) from ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3].

**The semantics of “no stipulation” in this document is that no additional restrictions are set and relevant provisions from QCP-n-qscd and NCP+ are applied directly.**

Issuing and managing Qualified Electronic Signature Certificates for Digi-ID is based on the requirements of the Policy QCP-n-qscd: Certificate Policy for EU qualified Certificates issued to natural persons with Private Key related to the certified Public Key in a QSCD.

Issuing and managing Authentication Certificates for Digi-ID is based on the requirements of the Policy NCP+: Normalised Certificate Policy requiring a Secure Cryptographic Device.

The Certification Service for Qualified Electronic Signature Certificates for Digi-ID described in this CP SHALL be qualified trust service according to the Trusted List of Estonia.

Data structures and communication protocols in use SHALL be described in ID Card documentation [15] where applicable.

In case of conflicts, the following documents SHALL be considered in the following order (prevailing ones first):

- QCP-n-qscd,
- NCP+,
- this CP,
- CPS.

To preserve IETF RFC 3647 [5] outline this CP is divided into nine parts, section headings that do not apply, are designated as "**Not applicable**". Each top-level chapter includes references to the relevant sections in ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

In this CP modal verbs in capital letters are to be interpreted as described in Clause 3.2 of the ETSI Drafting Rules [6] (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions).

Terms and acronyms listed in Clause 1.6 of this CP, are written starting with a capital letter in this CP.

## 1.2. Document Name and Identification

Refer to Clause 5.3 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

This document is named "SK ID Solutions AS – Certificate Policy for Digi-ID".

This CP is identified by OID: 1.3.6.1.4.1.10015.1.2

OID is composed according to the contents of the following table.

Parameter	OID reference
Internet attribute	1.3.6.1
Private entity attribute	4
Registered business attribute given by private business manager IANA	1
SK attribute in IANA register	10015
Certification service attribute	1.2

Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate for Digi-ID issued to Subscribers SHALL include OID's of the following policies:

- ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4] clause 5.3 c) for QCP-n-qscd: 0.4.0.194112.1.2  
 itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0) qualified-certificate-policies(194112)  
 policy-identifiers(1) qcp-natural-qscd (2)
- This CP.

Authentication Certificates for Digi-ID issued to Subscribers SHALL include OID's of the following policies:

- ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] clause 5.3 b) for NCP+: 0.4.0.2042.1.2  
 itu-t(0) identified-organization(4) etsi(0)  
 other-certificate-policies(2042)  
 policy-identifiers(1) ncplus (2)
- This CP.

## 1.3. PKI Participants

Refer to Clause 5.4 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

### 1.3.1. Certification Authorities

No stipulation.

### 1.3.2. Registration Authorities

The RA-s are laid down in Chapter 3 of the IDA [7].

NOTE: The PBGB and Ministry of Foreign Affairs CAN appear in multiple roles throughout the document. Throughout the rest of this CP a following distinction is made based on the role:

- both institutions are referred as RA when they are performing technical actions such as face to face authentication or delivery of Digi-ID;
- they are referred together as PBGB when they are representing Republic of Estonia in the role of Document Issuer according to IDA [7], e.g. during initial identification of persons or making decisions about their eligibility to apply for Digi-ID.

### 1.3.3. Subscribers

Subscriber is the Subject of the Certificate issued under this CP.

Subscriber can be only a natural person entitled by IDA [7].

### **1.3.4. Relying Parties**

Relying Parties are legal or natural persons who are making decisions based on the Certificate.

### **1.3.5. Other Participants**

Card Manufacturer prepares the cards in the factory and provides technical environment for personalisation in the RA office.

## **1.4. Certificate Usage**

Refer to Clause 5.5 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

### **1.4.1. Appropriate Certificate Uses**

Subscriber Certificates are intended for the following purposes:

Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate is intended for:

- creating Qualified Electronic Signatures compliant with eIDAS [2].

Authentication Certificate is intended for:

- Authentication,
- Encryption,
- secure e-mail.

CA Private Keys SHALL NOT be used to sign other types of Certificates except for the following:

- Subscriber Certificates compliant with QCP-n-qscd or NCP+,
- OCSP response verification Certificates,
- Internal Certificates for technical needs.

### **1.4.2. Prohibited Certificate Uses**

The use of the Subscriber Certificates issued under this CP is prohibited for any of the following purposes:

- unlawful activity (including cyber attacks and attempt to infringe the Certificate or the Digi-ID),
- issuance of new Certificates and information regarding Certificate validity,
- enabling other parties to use the Subscriber's Private Key,
- enabling the Certificate issued for electronic signing to be used in an automated way,
- using the Certificate issued for electronic signing for signing documents which can bring about unwanted consequences (including signing such documents for testing purposes).

The Subscriber Authentication Certificate cannot be used to create Qualified Electronic Signatures compliant with eIDAS [2].

## **1.5. Policy Administration**

### **1.5.1. Organization Administering the Document**

This CP is administered by SK.

SK ID Solutions AS

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<http://www.sk.ee/en/>

### 1.5.2. Contact Person

Business Development Manager  
 Email: info@sk.ee

### 1.5.3. Person Determining CPS Suitability for the Policy

No stipulation.

### 1.5.4. CP Approval Procedures

Amendments which do not change the meaning of this CP, such as spelling corrections, translation activities and contact details updates, are documented in the Versions and Changes section of the present document. In this case the fractional part of the document version number SHALL be enlarged.

In the case of substantial changes, the new CP version SHALL be clearly distinguishable from the previous ones, and the serial number SHALL be enlarged by one. The amended CP along with the enforcement date, which cannot be earlier than 30 days after publication, SHALL be published electronically on SK website.

All amendments to this CP SHALL be coordinated with PBGB and Card Manufacturer.

All amendments SHALL be approved by the business development manager and amended CP SHALL be enforced by the CEO.

## 1.6. Definitions and Acronyms

### 1.6.1. Terminology

In this CP the following terms have the following meaning.

Term	Definition
Authentication	Unique identification of a person by checking his/her alleged identity.
Card Manufacturer	Prepares the Digi-ID cards in the factory and provides technical environment for personalisation in the RA office.
Certificate	Public key, together with some other information, laid down in the Certificate Profile [8], rendered unforgeable via encipherment using the Private Key of the Certificate Authority which issued it.
Certificate Authority	A part of SK structure responsible for issuing and verifying electronic Certificates and Certificate Revocation Lists with its electronic signature.
Certificate Policy	A set of rules that indicates applicability of a specific Certificate to a particular community and/or PKI implementation with common security requirements.
Certification Practice Statement	One of the several documents that all together form the governance framework in which Certificates are created, issued, managed, and used.
Certificate Profile	Document that determines the information contained within a Certificate as well as the minimal requirements towards the Certificate.
Certificate Revocation List	A list of invalid (revoked, suspended) Certificates.
Certification Service	Trust service related to Issuing Certificates, managing suspension, termination of suspension, revocation, modification and re-key of the Certificates.

Directory Service	Trust service related to publication of Certificate validity information.
Distinguished name	Unique Subject name in the infrastructure of Certificates.
Digi-ID	Digital Identity Document.
Encrypting	Information treatment method changing the information unreadable for those who do not have necessary skills or rights.
ID-1	Format which defines physical characteristics of identification cards according to standard ISO/IEC 7816 [1].
Integrity	A characteristic of an array: information has not been changed after the array was created.
Object Identifier	An identifier used to uniquely name an object (OID).
Personal Data File	File on Digi-ID that includes the Subscriber's personal data.
PIN code	Activation code for the Authentication Certificate and for the Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate.
Private key	The key of a key pair that is assumed to be kept in secret by the holder of the key pair, and that is used to create electronic signatures and/or to decrypt electronic records or files that were encrypted with the corresponding Public Key.
Public Key	The key of a key pair that may be publicly disclosed by the holder of corresponding Private Key and that is used by Relying Party to verify electronic signatures created with the holder's corresponding Private Key and/or to encrypt messages so that they can be decrypted only with the holder's corresponding Private Key.
PUK code	The unblocking of PIN codes when they have been blocked after number of allowed consecutive incorrect entries.
Qualified Certificate	A certificate for electronic signatures, that is issued by the qualified trust service provider and meets the requirements laid down in Annex I of the eIDAS [2] Regulation.
Qualified Electronic Signature	Advanced electronic signature that is created by a qualified electronic signature creation device, and which is based on a Qualified Certificate for electronic signatures.
Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device	A Secure Signature Creation Device that meets the requirements laid down in eIDAS [2] Regulation.
Relying Party	Entity that relies upon the information contained within a Certificate.
Registration Authority	Entity that is responsible for identification and Authentication of Subjects of Certificates. Additionally, the Registration Authority may accept Certificate applications, check the applications and/or forward the applications to the Certificate Authority.
Secure Cryptographic Device	Device which holds the Private Key of the user, protects this key against compromise and performs signing or decryption functions on behalf of the user.
Subscriber	A natural person to whom Digi-ID Certificates are issued as a public service if he/she has a statutory right.
Subject	In this document, the Subject is the same as the Subscriber.
Terms and Conditions	Document that describes obligations and responsibilities of the Subscriber with respect to using Certificates. The Subscriber has to be familiar with the document and accept the Terms and Conditions [9] upon receipt the Certificates.

### 1.6.2. Acronyms

Acronym	Definition
---------	------------

CA	Certificate Authority
CP	Certificate Policy
CPS	Certification Practice Statement
CRL	Certificate Revocation List
CSR	Certificate Signing Request
eIDAS	Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 [2] of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC
IDA	Identity Documents Act [7]
NCP+	Normalised Certificate Policy requiring a Secure Cryptographic Device from ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3]
OCSP	Online Certificate Status Protocol
OID	Object Identifier, a unique object identification code
PBGB	Police and Border Guard Board
PKI	Public Key Infrastructure
QSCD	Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device
QCP-n-qscd	Policy for EU qualified certificate issued to a natural person where the private key and the related certificate reside on a QSCD from ETSI EN 319 411-2 [3]
RA	Registration Authority
SK	SK ID Solutions AS

## 2. Publication and Repository Responsibilities

Refer to Clause 6.1 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

### 2.1. Repositories

SK SHALL ensure that its repository is available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with a minimum of 99% availability overall per year with a scheduled downtime that does not exceed 0,5% annually.

### 2.2. Publication of Certification Information

#### 2.2.1. Publication and Notification Policies

This CP, the Certification Practice Statement [16], the Certificate Profile [8], as well as the Terms and Conditions [9] with the enforcement dates, SHALL be published on SK website <https://sk.ee/en/repository/> no less than 30 days prior to taking effect.

#### 2.2.2. Items not Published in the Certification Practice Statement

Information about service levels, fees and technical details laid out in mutual agreements between SK, PBGB and Card Manufacturer MAY be left out of CPS.

The CPS MAY not cover internal procedures of the PBGB and Card Manufacturer.

### 2.3. Time or Frequency of Publication

No stipulation.

## **2.4. Access Controls on Repositories**

No stipulation.

# **3. Identification and Authentication**

Refer to Clause 6.2 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

## **3.1. Naming**

The Distinguished Name of the Certificate SHALL comply with conventions set in the Certificate Profile [8].

### **3.1.1. Types of Names**

No stipulation.

### **3.1.2. Need for Names to be Meaningful**

All the values in the Subscriber information section of a Certificate SHALL be meaningful.

### **3.1.3. Anonymity or Pseudonymity of Subscribers**

Not applicable.

### **3.1.4. Rules for Interpreting Various Name Forms**

Pursuant to IDA [7], international letters SHALL be encoded according to ICAO transcription rules where necessary. Rules for generating e-mail addresses SHALL be as listed in clause 6.1 of the Certificate Profile [8].

### **3.1.5. Uniqueness of Names**

SK SHALL ensure that Certificates with matching Common Name (CN), SerialNumber and e-mail addresses in Subject Alternative Name (SAN) fields are not issued to different Subscribers.

### **3.1.6. Recognition, Authentication, and Role of Trademarks**

Not applicable.

## **3.2. Initial Identity Validation**

### **3.2.1. Method to Prove Possession of Private Key**

Private Keys SHALL be generated on the QSCD during personalisation by the PBGB.

### **3.2.2. Authentication of Organization Identity**

Not applicable.

### **3.2.3. Authentication of Individual Identity**

Authentication is carried out by RA in accordance with Chapter 3 of IDA [7].

### **3.2.4. Non-Verified Subscriber Information**

Non-verified Subscriber information SHALL NOT be allowed in a Certificate.

### 3.2.5. Validation of Authority

Validation is carried out by RA in accordance with IDA [7].

### 3.2.6. Criteria for Interoperation

No stipulation

## 3.3. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key Requests

### 3.3.1. Identification and Authentication for Routine Re-Key

Subscriber SHALL be identified using the valid Authentication Certificate of Digi-ID that needs to be re-keyed or according to Clause 3.2 of this CP.

### 3.3.2. Identification and Authentication for Re-Key After Revocation

Refer to Clause 3.2 of this CP.

## 3.4. Identification and Authentication for Revocation Request

No stipulation.

## 4. Certificate Life-Cycle Operational Requirements

Refer to Clause 6.3 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

### 4.1. Certificate Application

#### 4.1.1. Who Can Submit a Certificate Application

The eligibility for persons to request Digi-ID is defined in IDA [7]. SK SHALL accept CSRs only from the Card Manufacturer.

#### 4.1.2. Enrolment Process and Responsibilities

The responsibilities and process for making decisions about eligibility to apply for a Certificate are laid out in IDA [7].

It is the responsibility of Card Manufacturer to manufacture Digi-ID and initialize the card with correct version of firmware and visual layout.

Upon a positive decision PBGB WILL personalise a new Digi-ID, fill out Personal Data File, generate key pairs for Authentication and Qualified Electronic Signature and submit a pair of CSRs to Card Manufacturer. Card Manufacturer forwards the Certificate request to SK.

PBGB is responsible for submitting correct identification data (names, personal codes, dates) to the Card Manufacturer. The Card Manufacturer and SK will rely upon the values provided by PBGB.

SK is responsible for assigning the correct e-mail address in the eesti.ee domain to the Certificate for Authentication:

- re-use the previous one if the Subscriber already has an address assigned
- generate a previously unused address according to clause 6.1 of the Certificate Profile [8] if the Subscriber has a new name
- generate a previously unused address according to clause 6.1 of the Certificate Profile [8] if the Subscriber has not been previously assigned an address.

SK is responsible for keeping track of e-mail address assignments.

### 4.2. Certificate Application Processing

#### 4.2.1. Performing Identification and Authentication Functions

The Subscriber's identity WILL be validated by PBGB as described in Chapter 3 of IDA [7].



PBGB WILL send the Certificate requests to SK via the Card Manufacturer.  
SK SHALL accept CSRs only from the Card Manufacturer. SK and the Card Manufacturer SHALL rely upon identification data provided by PBGB.

#### **4.2.2. Approval or Rejection of Certificate Applications**

CA SHALL refuse to issue a Certificate if the Certificate request does not comply with the technical requirements set in applicable agreement s. If the data contained in a CSR needs to be modified, the corresponding amendment SHALL be coordinated with PBGB.

#### **4.2.3. Time to Process Certificate Applications**

In accordance with the applicable laws and agreements.

### **4.3. Certificate Issuance**

#### **4.3.1. CA Actions During Certificate Issuance**

CA SHALL allocate correct and unique e-mail address in the eesti.ee domain to the Subscriber. At this stage, OCSP service SHALL NOT return response "GOOD" and the Certificate SHALL NOT be made available via the Directory Service.

#### **4.3.2. Notifications to Subscriber by the CA of Issuance of Certificate**

No stipulation.

### **4.4. Certificate Acceptance**

#### **4.4.1. Conduct Constituting Certificate Acceptance**

No stipulation.

#### **4.4.2. Publication of the Certificate by the CA**

Certificate SHALL be published by the CA using the Directory Service immediately after the Subscriber has accepted it, OCSP SHALL start responding with "GOOD".

#### **4.4.3. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

No stipulation.

### **4.5. Key Pair and Certificate Usage**

#### **4.5.1. Subscriber Private Key and Certificate Usage**

No stipulation.

#### **4.5.2. Relying Party Public Key and Certificate Usage**

No stipulation.

### **4.6. Certificate Renewal**

Not allowed.

### **4.7. Certificate Re-Key**



Certificate re-key SHALL be allowed only upon successful personal identification of the Subscriber via physical identity checks or digital Authentication methods.

During Certificate re-key, the Certificates to be replaced SHALL be revoked.

Certificate re-key MAY be done only upon initial application in the case of Digi-ID manufacturing errors prior to the acceptance of the Certificates. In this case only the last pair of Certificates SHALL be written to the corresponding Digi-ID media and remain valid.

Certificate re-key MAY be done to extend the validity of Digi-ID pursuant to Chapter 9 of IDA [7].

All the erroneous or unusable Certificates SHALL be revoked immediately.

#### **4.7.1. Circumstances for Certificate Re-Key**

This CP treats recurring Digi-ID application as initial application for Digi-ID. If the Subscriber applies recurring Digi-ID, this request SHALL be processed as an application for a new Digi-ID, and physical authentication SHALL be done.

Certificate re-key is allowed to:

- replace an expired or broken Digi-ID;
- fix ASN.1 encoding errors in certificates;
- replace SHA-1 signatures with stronger cryptography;
- fix production errors that are discovered during quality checks;
- extend the validity of Digi-ID pursuant to Chapter 9 of IDA [7].

Additional circumstances for Certificate re-key SHALL be agreed upon with PBGB. CP and CPS SHALL be updated to reflect the changes.

#### **4.7.2. Who May Request Certification of a New Public Key**

Only the Subscriber and the Card Manufacturer together CAN initiate the re-key process unless the need to replace the Certificate is discovered during quality checks before the delivery of the Digi-ID to the Subscriber.

SK SHALL NOT accept re-key requests from other parties except for the Card Manufacturer.

#### **4.7.3. Processing Certificate Re-Keying Requests**

If the re-keying is to replace an expired or broken Digi-ID or to apply recurring Digi-ID application, the process is similar to initial issuance.

Otherwise the Certificate re-Keying requests SHALL be processed in an automated manner using secure channels for communication. Prior to issuing new Certificates the Subscriber SHALL be Authenticated by using the Private Key corresponding to the valid Authentication Certificate to be replaced. The new Certificates SHALL be written to Digi-ID media.

In case of validity extension of Digi-ID, the Card Manufacturer SHALL verify that the data in the Certificates matches the data in the application for the Certificates.

The old Certificates SHALL be revoked immediately. Both Digi-ID Certificates SHALL be replaced simultaneously.

#### **4.7.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

No stipulation.

#### **4.7.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of a Re-Keyed Certificate**

Refer to Clause 4.4.1 of this CP.

#### **4.7.6. Publication of the Re-Keyed Certificate by the CA**

Refer to Clause 4.4.2 of this CP.

#### **4.7.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

Refer to Clause 4.4.3 of this CP.

### **4.8. Certificate Modification**

Certificate modification SHALL be allowed only upon successful personal identification of the Subscriber via physical identity checks or digital Authentication methods.

During Certificate modification, the Certificates to be replaced SHALL be revoked.

Certificate modification MAY be done only upon initial application in the case of Digi-ID manufacturing errors prior to the acceptance of the Certificates. In this case only the last pair of Certificates SHALL be written to the corresponding Digi-ID media and remain valid. All the erroneous or unusable Certificates SHALL be revoked immediately.

#### **4.8.1. Circumstances for Certificate Modification**

Certificate modification is allowed to:

- change the data that is visually imprinted on the Digi-ID and stored in the Personal Data File;
- change e-mail addresses written to Subject Alternative Name field of the Authentication Certificate;
- fix ASN.1 encoding errors in certificates;
- replace SHA-1 signatures with stronger cryptography;
- fix production errors that are discovered during quality checks.

Additional circumstances for Certificate modification SHALL be agreed upon with PBGB. CP and CPS SHALL be updated to reflect the changes.

#### **4.8.2. Who May Request Certificate Modification**

Subscriber and the Card Manufacturer together CAN initiate the modification process. In case the need to replace the Certificate is discovered during quality checks before the delivery of the Digi-ID to the Subscriber Certificate Modification MAY be performed by the CA internally or requested by PBGB or Card Manufacturer.

SK SHALL NOT accept modification requests from other parties except for the Card Manufacturer.

#### **4.8.3. Processing Certificate Modification Requests**

In case of fixing production errors CA SHALL process Certificate modification requests and is not required to negotiate it with the Subscriber.

In case of changing the data that is visually imprinted on the Digi-ID and stored in the Personal Data File this request SHALL be processed as an application for a new Digi-ID, and physical authentication SHALL be done.

Otherwise the Certificate modification requests SHALL be processed in an automated manner using secure channels for communication. Prior to issuing new Certificates the Subscriber SHALL be authenticated by using the Private Key corresponding to the valid Authentication Certificate to be replaced. The new Certificates SHALL be written to the Digi-ID. The old Certificates SHALL be revoked immediately. Both certificates on the Digi-ID SHALL be replaced simultaneously.

#### **4.8.4. Notification of New Certificate Issuance to Subscriber**

No stipulation.

#### **4.8.5. Conduct Constituting Acceptance of Modified Certificate**

No stipulation.

#### **4.8.6. Publication of the Modified Certificate by the CA**

Refer to Clause 4.4.2 of this CP.

#### **4.8.7. Notification of Certificate Issuance by the CA to Other Entities**

Refer to Clause 4.4.3 of this CP.

### **4.9. Certificate Revocation and Suspension**

#### **4.9.1. Circumstances for Revocation**

Circumstances for Certificate revocation SHALL be as laid down in IDA [7] and Article 19 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.2. Who Can Request Revocation**

Entities eligible to request Certificate revocation SHALL be as laid down in IDA [7] and Article 19 of the Electronic Identification and Trust





Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.3. Procedure for Revocation Request**

The procedure for revocation request SHALL be as laid down in IDA [7] and Article 20 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.4. Revocation Request Grace Period**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.5. Time Within Which CA Must Process the Revocation Request**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.6. Revocation Checking Requirements for Relying Parties**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.7. CRL Issuance Frequency**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.8. Maximum Latency for CRLs**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.9. On-Line Revocation/Status Checking Availability**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.10. On-Line Revocation Checking Requirements**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.11. Other Forms of Revocation Advertisements Available**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.12. Special Requirements Related to Key Compromise**

No stipulation.

#### **4.9.13. Circumstances for Suspension**

Circumstances for Certificate suspension SHALL be as laid down in Article 17 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.14. Who Can Request Suspension**

Anyone can request Certificate suspension.

#### **4.9.15. Procedure for Suspension Request**

It SHALL be possible to request Certificate suspension via phone 24 hours a day, 7 days a week. Certificate suspension SHALL leave a uniquely identifiable trace.

#### **4.9.16. Limits on Suspension Period**

No limits.

#### **4.9.17. Circumstances for Termination of Suspension**

Circumstances for termination of Certificate suspension SHALL be as laid down in Article 18 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.18. Who Can Request Termination of Suspension**

Entities who can request termination of Certificate suspension SHALL be as laid down in Article 18 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

#### **4.9.19. Procedure for Termination of Suspension**

The procedure for termination of Certificate suspension SHALL be as laid down in Article 18 of the Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10].

### **4.10. Certificate Status Services**

#### **4.10.1. Operational Characteristics**

No stipulation.

#### **4.10.2. Service Availability**

SK SHALL ensure that its Certificate Status Services are available 24 hours a day, 7 days a week with a minimum of 99% availability overall per year with a scheduled downtime that does not exceed 0,5% annually.

#### **4.10.3. Operational Features**

No stipulation.

### **4.11. End of Subscription**

No stipulation.

### **4.12. Key Escrow and Recovery**

#### **4.12.1. Key Escrow and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Not allowed.

#### **4.12.2. Session Key Encapsulation and Recovery Policy and Practices**

Not applicable.

## **5. Facility, Management, and Operational Controls**

Refer to Clause 6.4 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

## **6. Technical Security Controls**

Refer to Clause 6.5 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

## **6.1. Key Pair Generation and Installation**

### **6.1.1. Key Pair Generation**

The Subscriber Certificate keys SHALL be generated using the QSCD by one of the following roles:

- Subscriber,
- PBGB.

### **6.1.2. Private Key Delivery to Subscriber**

Certificate keys SHALL be delivered on a QSCD that SHALL be handed over to the Subscriber by the PBGB.

### **6.1.3. Public Key Delivery to Certificate Issuer**

PBGB SHALL deliver the Public Key to the Card Manufacturer using a secure communication channel.

The Card Manufacturer SHALL deliver the Public Key to the CA using a secure communication channel.

### **6.1.4. CA Public Key Delivery to Relying Parties**

No stipulation.

### **6.1.5. Key Sizes**

Allowed key sizes SHALL be as described in the Certificate Profile [8].

### **6.1.6. Public Key Parameters Generation and Quality Checking**

No stipulation.

### **6.1.7. Key Usage Purposes (as per X.509 v3 Key Usage Field)**

Allowed key usage flags SHALL be set as described in the Certificate Profile [8].

## **6.2. Private Key Protection and Cryptographic Module Engineering Controls**

### **6.2.1. Cryptographic Module Standards and Controls**

Private Key SHALL be generated on a QSCD.

### **6.2.2. Private Key (n out of m) Multi-Person Control**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.3. Private Key Escrow**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.4. Private Key Backup**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.5. Private Key Archival**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.6. Private Key Transfer Into or From a Cryptographic Module**



No stipulation.

### **6.2.7. Private Key Storage on Cryptographic Module**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.8. Method of Activating Private Key**

The Subscriber SHALL be prompted to enter the PIN code of the Authentication Certificate at least once after the Digi-ID has been inserted into the card reader device.

The Subscriber SHALL be prompted to enter the PIN code of the Qualified Electronic Signature Certificate before every single operation done with the corresponding Private Key.

It SHALL be possible to create different PIN codes for different keys of the Subscriber.

The length of the PIN codes SHALL be at least:

- for the Authentication Key 4 numbers,
- for the signature Key 5 numbers,

The PUK code SHALL be at least 8 numbers.

### **6.2.9. Method of Deactivating Private Key**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.10. Method of Destroying Private Key**

No stipulation.

### **6.2.11. Cryptographic Module Rating**

No stipulation.

## **6.3. Other Aspects of Key Pair Management**

### **6.3.1. Public Key Archival**

No stipulation.

### **6.3.2. Certificate Operational Periods and Key Pair Usage Periods**

Validity period of the Subscriber Certificate SHALL NOT exceed the validity period of the corresponding Digi-ID for which it was issued.

## **6.4. Activation Data**

### **6.4.1. Activation Data Generation and Installation**

The initial activation data SHALL be generated by the Card Manufacturer and SHALL be included in a separate sealed envelope for delivery to the Subscriber. Copies of the PIN codes SHALL NOT be stored by the Card Manufacturer.

The Card Manufacturer SHALL produce replacement PIN codes and SHALL hand them over to RA in sealed envelopes. The mechanism for replacing the activation data SHALL ensure by technical means the impossibility to view or store the replacement activation data by the RA employee during the whole process.

RA SHALL issue replacement PIN codes to the Subscriber when the PIN codes need to be replaced or updated.

All PIN codes of a single Digi-ID are replaced at once.

Prior to issuing replacement PIN codes the RA SHALL Authenticate the Subscriber.

### **6.4.2. Activation Data Protection**

PIN codes SHALL be handed over personally to the Subscriber by the RA.

Copies of the PIN codes SHALL NOT be stored by the RA.

### **6.4.3. Other Aspects of Activation Data**

No stipulation.

## **6.5. Computer Security Controls**

### **6.5.1. Specific Computer Security Technical Requirements**

No stipulation.

### **6.5.2. Computer Security Rating**

No stipulation.

## **6.6. Life Cycle Technical Controls**

### **6.6.1. System Development Controls**

No stipulation.

### **6.6.2. Security Management Controls**

No stipulation.

### **6.6.3. Life Cycle Security Controls**

No stipulation.

## **6.7. Network Security Controls**

No stipulation.

## **6.8. Time-Stamping**

No stipulation.

# **7. Certificate, CRL, and OCSP Profiles**

Refer to Clause 6.6 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

## **7.1. Certificate Profile**

The Certificate SHALL comply with the profile described in the Certificate Profile [8].

## **7.2. CRL Profile**

The CRL SHALL comply with the profile described in the Certificate Profile [8].

### **7.3. OCSP Profile**

The OCSP responses SHALL comply with the profile described in the Certificate Profile [8].

## **8. Compliance Audit and Other Assessments**

Refer to Clause 6.7 of ETSI EN 319 411-1 [3] and ETSI EN 319 411-2 [4].

## **9. Other Business and Legal Matters**

### **9.1. Fees**

#### **9.1.1. Certificate Issuance or Renewal Fees**

No stipulation.

#### **9.1.2. Certificate Access Fees**

No stipulation.

#### **9.1.3. Revocation or Status Information Access Fees**

No stipulation.

#### **9.1.4. Fees for Other Services**

No stipulation.

#### **9.1.5. Refund Policy**

No stipulation.

### **9.2. Financial Responsibility**

#### **9.2.1. Insurance Coverage**

No stipulation.

#### **9.2.2. Other Assets**

No stipulation.

#### **9.2.3. Insurance or Warranty Coverage for End-Entities**

No stipulation.

### **9.3. Confidentiality of Business Information**

No stipulation.

### **9.4. Privacy of Personal Information**

#### **9.4.1. Privacy Plan**



No stipulation.

#### **9.4.2. Information Treated as Private**

No stipulation.

#### **9.4.3. Information Not Deemed Private**

No stipulation.

#### **9.4.4. Responsibility to Protect Private Information**

No stipulation.

#### **9.4.5. Notice and Consent to Use Private Information**

No stipulation.

#### **9.4.6. Disclosure Pursuant to Judicial or Administrative Process**

No stipulation.

#### **9.4.7. Other Information Disclosure Circumstances**

No stipulation.

### **9.5. Intellectual Property rights**

SK obtains intellectual property rights to this CP.

### **9.6. Representations and Warranties**

#### **9.6.1. CA Representations and Warranties**

An employee of CA SHALL NOT be punished for an intentional crime.

#### **9.6.2. RA Representations and Warranties**

An employee of RA SHALL NOT be punished for an intentional crime.

#### **9.6.3. Subscriber Representations and Warranties**

No stipulation.

#### **9.6.4. Relying Party Representations and Warranties**

Relying Party SHALL verify the validity of the Certificate using validation services offered by SK prior to using the Certificate.

Relying Party SHALL consider the limitations stated in the Certificate and SHALL ensure that the transaction to be accepted corresponds to this CP.

#### **9.6.5. Representations and Warranties of Other Participants**

An employee of the Card Manufacturer SHALL NOT be punished for an intentional crime.

### **9.7. Disclaimers of Warranties**



No stipulation.

## **9.8. Limitations of Liability**

No stipulation.

## **9.9. Indemnities**

No stipulation.

## **9.10. Term and Termination**

### **9.10.1. Term**

Refer to Clause 2.2.1 Publication and Notification Policies of this CP.

### **9.10.2. Termination**

This CP SHALL remain in force until it is replaced by the new version or when it is terminated due to the CA termination or when the service is terminated and all the Certificates therefore become invalid.

### **9.10.3. Effect of Termination and Survival**

SK SHALL communicate the conditions and effect of termination of this CP.

## **9.11. Individual Notices and Communications with Participants**

No stipulation.

## **9.12. Amendments**

### **9.12.1. Procedure for Amendment**

Refer to Clause 1.5.4 of this CP.

### **9.12.2. Notification Mechanism and Period**

Refer to Clause 1.5.4 of this CP.

### **9.12.3. Circumstances Under Which OID Must be Changed**

OID SHALL change when the scope of this CP changes or when the new type of the Certificate occurs.

## **9.13. Dispute Resolution Provisions**

No stipulation.

## **9.14. Governing Law**

This CP is governed by the jurisdictions of the European Union and Estonia.

## **9.15. Compliance with Applicable Law**



SK SHALL ensure compliance with the following requirements:

- eIDAS [2] - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC,
- Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act [10],
- Identity Documents Act [7],
- State Fees Act [11],
- Personal Data Protection Act [12],
- related European Standards:
  - ETSI EN 319 401 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers [13],
  - ETSI EN 319 411-1 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and Security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General requirements [3],
  - ETSI EN 319 411-2 Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates [4],
  - EN 419 211 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device [14].

## 9.16. Miscellaneous Provisions

### 9.16.1. Entire Agreement

No stipulation.

### 9.16.2. Assignment

No stipulation.

### 9.16.3. Severability

No stipulation.

### 9.16.4. Enforcement (Attorney's Fees and Waiver of Rights)

No stipulation.

### 9.16.5. Force Majeure

No stipulation.

## 9.17. Other Provisions

Not allowed.

## 10. References

- 1 ISO/IEC 7816, Parts 1-4, published: <http://iso.org/>;
- 2 eIDAS - Regulation (EU) No 910/2014 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC;
- 3 ETSI EN 319 411-1 V1.1.1 (2016-02) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 1: General Requirements;
- 4 ETSI EN 319 411-2 V2.1.1 (2016-02) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); Policy and security requirements for Trust Service Providers issuing certificates; Part 2: Policy requirements for certification authorities issuing qualified certificates;
- 5 RFC 3647 – Request For Comments 3647, Internet X.509 Public Key Infrastructure, Certificate Policy and Certification Practices Framework, published: <https://www.ietf.org/rfc/rfc3647.txt>;
- 6 ETSI Drafting Rules (Verbal forms for the expression of provisions);
- 7 Identity Documents Act, RT I 1999, 25, 365, published: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/511042016001/consolide/current>;



- 8 Certificate, CRL and OCSP Profile for personal identification documents of the Republic of Estonia, published: <https://sk.ee/en/repository/profiles/>;
- 9 Terms and Conditions for Use of Certificates of Personal Identification Documents of the Republic of Estonia, published: <https://sk.ee/en/repository/conditions-for-use-of-certificates/>;
- 10 Electronic Identification and Trust Services for Electronic Transactions Act, 26.10.2016, published: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/527102016001/consolide/current>;
- 11 State Fees Act, published: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/ee/519022016005/consolide/current>;
- 12 Personal Data Protection Act, 06.01.2016, published: <https://www.riigiteataja.ee/en/eli/507032016001/consolide/current>;
- 13 ETSI EN 319 401 V2.1.1 (2016-02) Electronic Signatures and Infrastructures (ESI); General Policy Requirements for Trust Service Providers;
- 14 ETSI EN 419 211 Protection profiles for secure signature creation device;
- 15 ID card documentation webpage: <http://www.id.ee/index.php?id=35772>;
- 16 SK ID Solutions AS - ESTEID-SK Certification Practice Statement, published: <https://www.sk.ee/repositoorium/CPS/>.