

# QSCD-Certificate

of products according article 30 para 1 and article 39 para 2  
eIDAS

valid until 2023-12-14

**TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH**  
TÜV NORD GROUP  
**Certification Body**  
**Langemarckstr. 20**  
**45141 Essen, Germany**

hereby determines in accordance with Article 30 para. 1 eIDAS<sup>1</sup>  
the conformity of the  
qualified electronic signature creation device

**Smart-ID SecureZone, Version 10.3.5**

of

**SK ID Solutions AS**

with the requirements of eIDAS mentioned in chapter 2.

The documentation of this certification has been registered under:

**TUVIT.9801.QSCD.12.2018.**

Essen, 2018-12-14

---

Dr. Christoph Sutter  
Head of Certification Body



TÜV Informationstechnik GmbH is a notified designated certification body under article 30 para 2 of eIDAS<sup>1</sup>.

---

<sup>1</sup> REGULATION (EU) No 910/2014 OF THE EUROPEAN PARLIAMENT AND OF THE COUNCIL of 23 July 2014 on electronic identification and trust services for electronic transactions in the internal market and repealing Directive 1999/93/EC

The certificate TUVIT.9801.QSCD.12.2018 comprises 6 pages.

## 1 Information about the Product

### 1.1 Type and Name of the Product

Qualified Electronic Signature Creation Device (QSCD)  
Smart-ID SecureZone, Version 10.3.5

### 1.2 Manufacturer of the Product

SK ID Solutions AS  
Pärnu avenue 141  
11314 Tallinn, Estonia

### 1.3 Description of the Product

The QSCD consists of software component (short TOE), a mobile client (user interface to the signer) and a Hardware Security Module (HSM) for managing cryptographic keys. It is a remote QSCD where the qualified trust service provider manages the electronic signature creation data on behalf of a signatory.

The TOE is the software product "Smart-ID SecureZone". It is a Java application server package, which implements the server-side functions of the Threshold Signature Scheme Protocol for the signer and the management functions for the administrators.

The Threshold Signature Scheme Protocol consists of a cryptographic protocol and algorithms, which are followed by the signer and the TOE to generate the distributed key pair of the Signer and later using the key pair to produce the signature of the Signer.

The Signer, who follows the client-side functions of the TSSP, can use the TOE services to enrol new key pairs, create digital signatures and to destroy the key pairs. The TOE alone does not create the whole digital signature on behalf of the Signer, but they both participate in the cryptographic protocol.

The TOE is deployed in a dedicated tamper protected environment that is connected to the HSM via a trusted channel. It uses the Signature Activation Data (SAD) that the signer enters on the mobile client to complete the signature computation with the HSM.

### 1.4 Delivery of the Product

The TOE including the TOE documentation is composed in a software zip-archive, which is delivered via a delivery system. The integrity of the delivered TOE has to be checked comparing the SHA-384 hash values of the TOE.

No.	Type	Item / SHA-384 Hash Value	Form of Delivery
1.	SW	SecureZone binary package (file name: smart-id-sz.war) 0646936b40da8292bcc77c3c f96a2271c631fbf67b5fa748 b2de0fa46d5505e8cca66797 7397a5eba30948d66739b77a	Secure file transfer system

No.	Type	Item / SHA-384 Hash Value	Form of Delivery
2.	SW	SecureZone Admin CLI binary package (file name: secure-zone-cli-all.jar) 4aefb0d91221eb88c3a264e3 6a38b93acb6c5004910f5860 ba68d99de15b20f425391764 1b629d201d0d29b3ff273ac6	Secure file transfer system
3.	SW	SecureZone Admin CLI binary package sha384 hash (file name: secure.zone.cli.all.jar.sha384) ad7fb6aaf9ad644627eee546 9fb02cf473b5ead9	Secure file transfer system
4.	DOC / Guidance	Installation Guide for SecureZone, Version 1.7_v112 as of 2018-09-17, file name install_guide.pdf, 7eb3995a7f7f4d74af68f0b1 76f88825ef6414cd607bb70c 45c891e4db905ab81a8b19cc 5f91e6859db5a2838e5b5886	Secure file transfer system
5.	DOC / Guidance	Administration Guide for SecureZone, Version 1.7_v106 as of 2018-09-11, file name: admin_guide.pdf, adfea424f66b84b4ff5967df d33f0c5ffffef6768aaeed624 938deb098bb779fbbfee4c99 4e2925794f64b1cb26e40c0d	Secure file transfer system
6.	DOC / Guidance	Signer User Guidance information for SecureZone and TSE library operators, Version 2.2_26 as of 2018-08-30, file name: signers_guide.pdf 71cf10e9844ad7707c5ea062 8f5edc80ffc2f43a02dc1aa4 b330d79e2d6d6acd333f6526 f2ff9ae03c732f012f2156bc	Secure file transfer system
7.	DOC / Guidance	Smart-ID SecureZone Monitoring Guide, Version 1.1_v18 as of 2018-07-23, file name: monitoring_guide.pdf 8f5ea882e546f1b0a4fe0ec0 109bed8e841c3e60a847b68a a325ddf69a10b2c02226eb42 46b9fe0af5bf4f5a2daf1ffa	Secure file transfer system
8.	DOC / Guidance	Smart-ID SecureZone Technical Architecture, version 10.12, as of 2018-09-12, file name: Smart-ID_SZ_Architecture_v10.12.pdf d5eb6e143ddaaba3fdda3b10 d80751d77843f44cee3efefe 584a8f63e49476eba562bb28 a6c96739e6c83928c2763ecc	Secure file transfer system

The information for the integrity check process is delivered within a digitally signed delivery report in .asice format.

No.	Type	Item	Form of Delivery
9.	DOC / Configuration	Release Notes document (file name: Smart-ID Release notes-Secure Zone 10.3.5)	Secure file transfer system, Delivered in digitally signed container containing overview of changes and checksums of all delivered components.
10.	txt	Checksums txt (file name: smartid-sz-checksums- 10.3.5)	Secure file transfer system, Delivered in digitally signed container containing overview of checksums of all delivered components.

The delivery of the HSM and mobile client must be performed according to their certification requirements.

## 2 Compliance with the requirements of eIDAS

Smart-ID SecureZone has provided evidence of conformity with regard to the following requirements for qualified electronic signature devices laid down in eIDAS.

<u>Requirement</u>	<u>Fulfilment by the TOE</u>
<b>Article 30</b>	<b>Requirements for qualified electronic signature creation devices</b>
Para. 1	Qualified electronic signature creation devices shall meet the requirements laid down in Annex II.
<b>Annex II eIDAS</b>	<b>Requirements for qualified electronic signature creation devices</b>
Para. 1 a-d)	<p>Qualified electronic signature creation devices shall ensure, by appropriate technical and procedural means, that at least:</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>(a) the confidentiality of the electronic signature creation data used for electronic signature creation is reasonably assured;</li> <li>(b) the electronic signature creation data used for electronic signature creation can practically occur only once;</li> <li>(c) the electronic signature creation data used for electronic signature creation cannot, with reasonable assurance, be derived and the electronic signature is reliably protected against forgery using currently available technology;</li> <li>(d) the electronic signature creation data used for electronic signature creation can be reliably protected by the legitimate signatory against use by others.</li> </ul>
Para. 2	Qualified electronic signature creation devices shall not alter the data to be signed or prevent such data from being presented to the signatory prior to signing.
Para. 3	Generating or managing electronic signature creation data on behalf of the signatory may only be done by a qualified trust service provider.

Para. 4 a-b) Without prejudice to point (d) of point 1, qualified trust service providers managing electronic signature creation data on behalf of the signatory may duplicate the electronic signature creation data only for back-up purposes provided the following requirements are met:

(a) the security of the duplicated datasets must be at the same level as for the original datasets;

(b) the number of duplicated datasets shall not exceed the minimum needed to ensure continuity of the service.

### 3 Operating Conditions

The following operational conditions must be fulfilled:

- The TOE must be implemented within the environment of a qualified Trust Service Provider, which fulfils the requirements as specified in the eIDAS.
- The TOE's environment must be physically secured.
- For the cryptographic key generation and cryptographic operations the CC certified HSM Thales nShield HSM Family v11.72.02 (Certificate No 1/16, as of 2016-03-10 from OCSI – Organismo di Certificazione della Sicurezza Informatica, via Viale America, 201, 00144 Roma, Italy) must be installed, configured and used as randomness source for the Secure Zone.
- As user interface, the mobile application with a certified TSE library that is CC evaluated with the Assurance at least level EAL2 must be used by the Signer.
- The administrators must only accept secure digest algorithms (SHA-256 or better) for generation of the data to be signed representation (DTBS/R).
- The Secure Zone server must be synchronized to a trusted time source.
- Only trustworthy, well-trained personal must be assigned to perform administrator duties.
- Administration tasks must be performed with dual control.
- The network-based and channel-based security must be configured in order to protect the transmitted DTBS/R from the disclosure.

### 4 Algorithms and Corresponding Parameters

For the creation of qualified electronic signatures, the TOE uses the cryptographic algorithm:

- RSASSA-PKCS1-V1\_5 according to PKCS#1: RSA Cryptography Specifications, Version 2.2 as of November 2016 (RFC8017) with the cryptographic key sizes 4094, 4095, 4096, 6142, 6143, 6144, 8190, 8191, 8192.

### 5 Assurance Level and Strength of Mechanism

The TOE security assurance requirements are based entirely on the assurance components and classes defined in part 3 of Common Criteria (see part C of this

report or [CC] Part 3 for details). The TOE meets the assurance requirements of assurance level EAL 4+ (Evaluation Assurance Level 4+) augmented by AVA\_VAN.5 (Advanced methodical vulnerability analysis).

## **6 Validity Period of the QSCD-Certificate**

This certificate is only valid in conjunction with the certificate TUVIT-TSZ-CC-9263-2018 and the corresponding certification report.

The validity period of the QSCD certificate depends on the strength of security mechanisms and algorithms that are implemented in the product and is limited 14<sup>th</sup> December 2023 at maximum.

At a given time, the validity period can be extended or shortened if there are new findings regarding the suitability of security mechanisms or algorithms.